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When your enemy is making a very serious mistake, don’t be impolite and disturb him.
Napoleon Bonaparte
War without history
There is nothing so unfashionable as the recent past. In American politics, it is now 
a slur to accuse one’s opponent of a ‘pre-9/11 mentality’. Senators Barack Obama 
and John McCain both played this card in their race for President.1 Indeed, the ‘war 
on terror’, defined as a war like no other, is a denial of history.2 It treats history as 
something to be contrasted with and reacted against. The Bush administration may 
invoke Churchill and Hitler in its moral language; but its strategic language speaks 
of 9/11 as a rupture with the past. For President Bush, after the onslaught on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, ‘night fell on a different world’. He declared 
war on ‘every terrorist group of global reach’.3 This was a ‘unique war’, a struggle 
against terrorism itself.4 As this suggests, the notion that the war is exceptional has 
encouraged another idea: that it is a war without limitation. On both sides of the 
Atlantic, leaders pronounced visions of open-ended conflict. After 9/11, Britain’s 
prime minister Tony Blair identified a new struggle in maximalist terms. ‘This 
mass terrorism is the new evil in our world today … we, the democracies of this 
world, are going to have to come together to fight it together and eradicate this 
evil completely.’5 At his party conference that year, Blair declared: ‘Let us re-order 
this world.’6 The radical nature of the threat pervades the TV series 24, which 
* I am very grateful to Rob Dover, Theo Farrell, Hew Strachan, Alex Marshall, Chris Tripodi, Katherine Brown, 
Andrew Bacevich, Robert Saunders and the anonymous referee for their comments on earlier versions of this 
article.
1 Kevin Whitelaw, ‘McCain, Obama trade jabs on terrorism and national security: McCain’s campaign accuses 
Obama of having a pre-9/11 mindset’, US News, 18 June 2006 and Nick Juliano, ‘Obama, McCain camps spar 
over who has “pre-9/11 mindset”’, 17 June 2008, http://rawstory.com/news08/2008/06/17/obama-mccain-
camps-spar-over-who-has-pre-911-mindset/, accessed 14 October 2008.
2 As Adam Roberts also argues: ‘The “War on Terror” in historical perspective’, Survival 47: 2, 2005, pp. 101–30.
3 President George W. Bush, address to Joint Session of Congress, 20 Sept. 2001.
4 For Bush’s comments on the ‘unique war’, see ‘President Bush discusses the global war on terror in Tipp 
City, Ohio’, 19 April 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070419–3.html, accessed 15 
October 2008. As the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States declares at p. 5, ‘The enemy is not 
a single political regime, or person, or religion, or ideology. The enemy is terrorism.’
5 Michael White and Patrick Wintour, ‘Blair calls for world fight against terror’, Guardian, 12 Sept. 2001.
6 ‘Labour conference: full text, Tony Blair’s speech’, Guardian, 2 Oct. 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/poli-
tics/2001/oct/02/labourconference.labour7, accessed 30 June 2008.
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lawyers designing American interrogation techniques quoted more than the US 
consti tution.7 The show’s fictional chief of staff sees the constitution as unsuited 
for an age of mass terror. ‘George Washington’s enemies wore bright red coats 
and marched in a straight line. The Founders could not have conceived of a state-
less enemy hiding among us, that targets not our soldiers but our civilisation.’8 In 
high politics and popular culture, three ideas became intertwined: that the new 
terrorism is a super-threat; that the war against it is exceptional; and that it must 
be waged with countermeasures of almost unbounded scope and ambition.
This notion of exceptionality underpins the ‘Bush Doctrine’ and its planks of 
unilateralism, pre-emptive war and democracy promotion. In its embrace of the 
new, it has little time for the Cold War. The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of 2002 mentions it often, but mostly as a legacy to be relinquished.9 
Central to Cold War strategy was the doctrine of containment, formulated in 
1946–7 by the professional bureaucrat George Kennan (1904–2005). In his ‘Long 
Telegram’, Kennan argued that the hostility of the Soviet Union derived from 
intrinsic tendencies that could be countered only with ‘patience and firmness’. 
Anonymously in 1947, he argued that the Soviet Union could be contained by 
‘adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting 
geographical and political points’.10 Kennan’s containment was a long-term appli-
cation of American staying power, economic investment, military deterrence 
and the creation of power balances. It would limit Soviet expansion and prevent 
an imbalance of power in Eurasia. By expansion, Kennan meant particularly the 
subversion of dislocated populations by local communists. This problem was 
primarily a political one, to be addressed mainly by political means. Because of 
its internal weaknesses, the Soviet Union would eventually fail, or mellow out. 
America could prevail without exhausting itself or losing its soul. This proved to 
be a protean concept capable of wide interpretation.11 Yet containment was the 
idea around which American grand strategy against the Soviet Union between 
1945 and 1990 was debated.
The shock of mass-casualty terrorism on American soil spread doubts about this 
strategy. Many concluded that containment cannot work against today’s wilder 
threats. As they saw it, such a strategy entails unacceptable risks against ‘irrational’ 
adversaries, conceding them time and initiative by leaving them in the field. 
Bush claimed that ‘after September 11, the doctrine of containment just doesn’t 
hold any water’.12 Senator Obama agreed. The Soviet Union was ‘operating on a 
7 Dahlia Lithwick, ‘The fiction behind torture policy’, Time, 26 July 2008.
8 24, season 6, episode 7.
9 President of the United States, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: US 
Government Printing Office, Sept. 2002), pp. 13, 15, 27, 29. The Bush administration may revere Kennan, but 
only for general political inspiration, not as a source of strategic insight. See Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, 
‘Remarks on the occasion of George Kennan’s centenary birthday’, 4 Feb. 2004, at www.state.gov/secretary/
rm/29683.htm (20 Sept. 2004), accessed 1 August 2008.
10 [X], ‘The sources of Soviet conduct’, Foreign Affairs 25: 4, July 1947, pp. 566–82.
11 See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of American national security policy during the Cold 
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. ix.
12 Cited in David Dunn, ‘Myths, motivations and “misunderestimations”’: the Bush Administration and Iraq’, 
International Affairs 79: 2, 2003, p. 292 and James Bone, ‘Ministers united over Saddam’s defiance’, The Times, 7 
Feb. 2003.
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model that we could comprehend … they don’t want to be blown up, we don’t 
want to be blown up, so you do game theory and calculate ways to contain … 
[but] certain elements within the Islamic world right now don’t make those same 
calculations.’13
In many respects, the standoff between America and the Soviet Union was clearly 
different from that between America and Al-Qaeda. John Gaddis, doyen of Cold 
War historians and admirer of Kennan, warns against plagiarizing strategy from 
another era.14 Al-Qaeda does not deploy massed forces along frontiers, convene 
summits on arms control or jostle for prestige in hockey matches.15 Today’s terror-
ists, with their violent jihadi extremism, far-flung networks, unlimited aims and 
deadly weapons, are not our parents’ terrorists. ‘Containment’ may have been 
appropriate against visible, territorially defined and predictable enemies. But what 
good is it against stateless ‘nowhere men’ inspired by apocalyptic religion who 
inflict megadeath without a return address?
These arguments are consciously forward-looking. But they promote an 
ahistorical reductionism by dismissing the past. While the outward forms of the 
Cold War are different, some of its logic is not. The Cold War was not just a 
chess game between superpowers. It featured debates over transnational terrorism, 
a contest over ideologies that transcended formal boundaries, tradeoffs between 
civil liberties and security, and the problem of competing without conventional 
war. Containment need not presume a predictable enemy within a delimited 
geopolitical space. It can be tailored to a reckless enemy too. It can mean limiting 
capabilities instead of ambitions, isolating the enemy politically as well as confining 
it geographically. Al-Qaeda may be distinctive in its scope, structure and methods, 
but it should not be endowed with too much mystique. As Audrey Cronin notes, it 
is subject to similar dynamics and vulnerabilities as historical movements that wage 
terror to pursue political objectives.16 It is not a purely stateless force. It needs and 
seeks the sanctuary or material assistance of states, whether Sudan, Afghanistan 
or Somalia.17 And it can suffer if it misdirects its violence or fails to offer a viable 
political vision.
This article makes four arguments. They are: that the United States has a strategy 
deficit; that a modified doctrine of containment can help fix this, by getting the 
United States to change its calculus of risk versus cost; that even though this 
strategy of lowering unacceptable costs entails risks, these would be more bearable 
than present burdens; and that more incremental efforts will suffice because the 
enemy is ultimately self-defeating.
13 David Mendell, ‘Obama would consider missile strikes on Iran’, Chicago Tribune, 25 Sept. 2004.
14 John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Strategies of containment, past and future’, Hoover Digest, 2001, p. 4, observes, ‘anyone 
who might see that strategy … as a blueprint for what the United States should do as we enter the second 
decade of the post-Cold War era should … proceed very cautiously.’
15 The Cold War comparison is considered also by Ehsan M. Ahrari, ‘Why the Long War can and cannot be 
compared to the Cold War’, Comparative Strategy 26: 4, 2007, pp. 275–84.
16 Audrey Cronin, Ending terrorism: lessons for defeating Al Qaeda, Adelphi Paper 394 (London: International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies, 2007).
17 Michael Evans, ‘Al-Qaeda finds three safe havens for terror training’, The Times, 2 July 2008.
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The strategy deficit
Skilful strategy defines problems in small enough ways to manage. But the vision 
of the ‘war on terror’ grew more as a theology than a strategy. It declared an 
existential struggle to destroy an abstraction (‘terrorism’), proclaimed a historical 
mission to spread democracy and recognized few limits on American power. It 
stressed willpower above capacity. It urged Americans to keep shopping while its 
military transformed the world. Above all, it was vague. Even as the Bush admin-
istration articulated world-historical aims, it was ambiguous on detail and almost 
silent on the acceptable price of victory.
America’s initial response to the 9/11 atrocities focused on the nightmare of zealots 
armed with biological or nuclear weapons, the confluence of lethal technology and 
terrorism. It was a counter-proliferation agenda. But this vision grew symbioti-
cally with the pulse of the battlefield. In post-conquest Iraq, WMD arsenals were 
not found, swift invasion turned into protracted occupation and America’s new 
regency faced an insurgency of unexpected resilience. The Bush administration 
ramped up a more ambitious rhetoric, a ‘Strategy of Freedom’, that was already 
present in declaratory documents such as the National Security Strategy (2002) 
and the National Strategy on Combating Terrorism (2003). The theology saw the 
spread of political freedom as the antidote to transnational terrorism. It aimed to 
alter the condition of the Arab Islamic world and drain the swamp from which 
Al-Qaeda’s toxic ideology had come. Reaching beyond Al-Qaeda’s network, the 
war proliferated into multiple conflicts. A war ostensibly embarked upon to abolish 
terrorism became engulfed in a blizzard of different agendas, such as pre-emption, 
stabilization, counter-insurgency, the war on drugs and democracy promotion. 
Al-Qaeda became one of a mosaic of enemies alongside warlords, Sunni suprema-
cists and Iranian theocrats. Some commentators announced World War IV.18
The long-term outcome of this project is unknown. But five years after the 
invasion of Iraq, and seven years after the 9/11 attacks, we can draw up a balance 
sheet. The war can report gains. It has struck hard against Al-Qaeda’s network, 
which now finds the world a vastly more dangerous place than before 9/11. 
Al-Qaeda’s strategy was to export a civil war in the Islamic world to the ‘far enemy’. 
Its spectacular violence would inspire a mass uprising of Muslims against the ‘near 
enemy’, corrupt ‘apostate’ regimes at home.19 The United States was weak and 
vulnerable, and if terrorized would abandon the region and its client states. So 
far, Al-Qaeda has failed to create this political response. America is still there and 
those regimes have held on. The mass uprising is the dog that hasn’t barked. An 
international coalition of states has curtailed the militants’ ability to operate. In 
the First World, attackers continually fail or are intercepted. In a major theatre 
of Al-Qaeda’s war, Iraq, the movement has been bloodied by a revolt against its 
overreaching brutality, a blowback with wider ripples. Al-Qaeda’s despairing 
theorists speak of a great reversal.
 18 Eliot Cohen, ‘World War IV: let’s call this conflict what it is’, Wall Street Journal, 20 Nov. 2001 and Norman 
Podhoretz, World War IV: the long struggle against Islamo-fascism (New York: Doubleday, 2007).
19 Peter Bergen, ‘What were the causes of 9/11?’, Prospect, no. 126, Sept. 2006 and George Friedman, America’s 
secret war: inside the worldwide struggle between the United States and its enemies (London: Doubleday, 2006), p. 332.
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Rumours that America is finished are overheated. They come less from sober 
assessment and more from declinist ideology with a poor record of prediction.20 
The sky has not fallen on America’s alliances—despite the frictions in American–
west European relationships over the invasion of Iraq in 2003. There are strongly 
Atlanticist, pro-American governments in Paris, Berlin and London. The United 
States has strengthened its ties with states across Asia, from India to Japan, from 
Singapore to Vietnam. Despite problems such as a weakening dollar, the stock 
market and banking crash and high oil prices, the United States is likely to remain 
the world’s largest economy, with potential rivals still heavily reliant on American 
investment and consumption. It remains the principal guarantor of international 
trade, the indispensable actor in fields ranging from humanitarian intervention 
to science and technology, and will sustain the largest, most potent military at 
a modest fraction of GDP. Its likely competitors face serious internal problems. 
Multilateral institutions of the international community can still be paralysed by 
the jealous interests of their members. Predicting the rise and fall of great powers 
is an inexact science. Nevertheless, America will probably remain a superpower 
for decades to come.
But something, nevertheless, has gone wrong. As its critics note, the war 
on terror has proven strategically illiterate.21 Whether or not the costs borne 
are worth it is always a value judgement. But relative to the mixed results, the 
resources and energy spent have been heavy and the cost unsustainable. America 
is now engaged in two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, trying to support new and 
fragile state apparatuses in deeply unfavourable circumstances. War in Afghani-
stan toppled an oppressive regime that harboured Al-Qaeda. It offered an end to 
gender apartheid and led to the return home of millions of Afghan émigrés. But 
the war has failed to marginalize or outgovern the Taleban, which has been able to 
recover and return, posing as a force of order and alternative government against 
a corrupt state. At present, the extent of the Taleban’s presence in Afghanistan 
may be as high as 72 per cent, and it threatens most major highways.22 War in 
Iraq removed a genocidal tyrant and serial aggressor. But it resulted in horrific 
communal and sectarian bloodshed, rampant criminality and a refugee exodus. 
Conservative estimates put Afghan deaths in the tens of thousands, Iraqi deaths in 
the hundreds of thousands.
Operations in Iraq alone are running at a cost of $2 billion a week. When 
one factors in added indirect costs, such as care for the wounded and long-term 
support for veterans, interest on money borrowed to pay for the war, maintaining 
and restoring military capabilities frayed by Iraq and even higher oil prices partly 
20 See Robert J. Lieber, ‘Falling upwards: declinism, the box set’, World Affairs, Summer 2008 and Fareed Zakaria, 
‘The future of American power’, Foreign Affairs 87: 3, May/June 2008, pp. 18–43.
21 For critical assessments of the war on terror, see Daniel Byman, The five front war: the better way to fight global 
jihad (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2008); Philip H. Gordon, Winning the right war: the path to security for America and the 
world (New York: Times Books, 2007), pp. 1–37; Charles Pena, Winning the un-war: a new strategy for the war on 
terrorism (Washington DC: Potamic Books, 2006); Hew Strachan, ‘The lost meaning of strategy’, Survival 47: 
3, 2005, pp. 33–54 and Stephen D. Biddle, American grand strategy after 9/11: an assessment (Carlisle, PA: US Army 
War College, April 2005).
22 Jon Hemming, ‘Taliban in 72 percent of Afghanistan, think-tank says’, Washington Post, 8 Dec. 2008. Presence 
is defined as an average of one or more insurgent attacks per week over the entire year.
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boosted by the war, the bill rises considerably, even as high as $25 billion per month 
according to Joseph Stiglitz, the former chief economist of the World Bank.23 
While the defence budget as a share of GDP remains low relative to Cold War 
levels, the unanticipated fiscal drain of the war could retard economic growth, run 
up unsustainable budget deficits, exacerbate the balance of payments  imbalance and 
weaken America’s overall ability to balance economic expenditure with military 
power. Putting America’s economic viability and social fabric under such strain 
is a heavy sacrifice for gains in Iraq that even General Petraeus acknowledges are 
fragile. As a measure of how misallocated these resources have been, two weeks of 
operations in Iraq cost more than it would take to triple the Nunn–Lugar nuclear 
weapon control programme in the former Soviet Union, the kind of scheme that 
would help forestall nuclear terrorism.24 Across the board, this burden on resources 
reduces America’s capacity to respond to long-term problems and sudden contin-
gencies, from the political situation on the Korean peninsula to climate change. To 
this extent, Al-Qaeda can congratulate itself on drawing its adversary into crisis.
As well as misallocating wealth, this state of affairs has sobering political costs. 
By expanding the lineaments of a police state, through torture, prison colonies 
or extraordinary rendition of suspects to dungeon states, America stains its legiti-
macy. It is not the moral equivalent of Al-Qaeda. But these policies make it harder 
to make that argument. And by inflaming international tensions, the war creates 
fresh dangers. Large-scale military occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan feed 
crises on the flanks. Even if Afghanistan were to become a tranquil democracy 
tomorrow, the occupation could spill over into a wider conflict and radicalize 
politics in Pakistan. Assassinations, postponed elections, riots and rising militancy 
in tribal lands suggest a dangerous volatility. If such instability translated into a 
revolution, the nuclear power could go theocratic, or descend into civil war with 
untold consequences.25 Even if the ‘surge’ dramatically succeeds and Iraq were 
to become a Switzerland of the Gulf tomorrow, the occupation would still have 
radicalized Iranian politics. America did not create the aggressive religiosity of 
Iran’s President Ahmedinejad. But with forces in two neighbouring states, it made 
Iranian politics hospitable for him by encouraging fears that America is encircling 
Iran. The theocracy in Iran could go nuclear. Even if this war smashes Al-Qaeda, 
it raises the risks of dangerous unintended consequences while shrinking America’s 
capacity to deal with them.
These errors since 9/11 can partly be traced to failures of competence and 
capacity. But they are also due to conceptual confusion. The ‘war on terror’ is 
a war declared on a tactical method rather than an identifiable group, for cosmic 
rather than achievable goals, with little grasp of ends, ways and means or weighing 
of vital versus peripheral interests. The official documents of this war conceive of 
23 Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, The three trillion dollar war: the true cost of the Iraq conflict (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2008).
24 Amy F. Woolf, Nunn–Lugar cooperative threat reduction programs: issues for Congress (Washington DC: Congres-
sional Research Service, 2002); also cited in Biddle, American grand strategy, p. 25.
25 Pakistani politics has become more volatile, although, as I illustrate below, support for Al-Qaeda has  reportedly 
fallen sharply.
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it as a ‘battle of ideas’ as well as arms, a campaign against a murderous ideology 
as well as those who espouse it.26 Unless this approach identifies the war of ideas 
tightly with particular physical and political entities, it takes an undifferentiated 
view of a universal battlespace and is open to entanglement anywhere within 
it. Imprecise vocabulary tends to conflate rather than distinguish. Ignoring the 
discipline that strategy requires, it fails to circumscribe the war within manage-
able boundaries and to direct resources towards the pursuit of precisely delin-
eated interests.27 The confusing number of simultaneous conflicts within Iraq is 
a symptom of this problem. An unfocused approach also overlooks the mutual 
dynamic by which policy ends must be compromised to fit military means, as well 
as vice versa. Instead, the architects of the war presumed America to have almost 
infinite capacity. And they did not articulate a convincing ‘endgame’. Beyond a bid 
to make America safe by giving the Muslim world a new birth of freedom, and a 
rhetorical pledge to ‘stay on offence’, there is no theory of victory.
One response to this analysis is to question whether we need grand strategy at 
all. Some argue that the very concept of war in this context is outsized. It exagger-
ates threats, concedes an inflated status to insurgents/terrorists, permits human 
rights abuse and entails endless conflict.28 Yet Al-Qaeda in reality is global in its 
breadth of operation, its vision of world conflict and its international profile, even 
as an umbrella ‘brand’ that attracts local struggles to its banner. It may not mobilize 
armies of millions like the Axis powers or the Soviet Union; and its ability to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction is in doubt.29 But it has struck blows which, 
if serially repeated, would threaten social cohesion and undermine confidence in 
government and the integrity of the state. And in an economically interdependent 
world, few are beyond the crosshairs, as the millions impoverished in the Third 
World by the 9/11 strikes and the ravaged economy of Bali suggest.30 Al-Qaeda also 
poses a more indirect, insidious threat. Its attacks can cause panicked reactions and 
inflame other crises. Like Serbia’s Black Hand movement in June 1914, Al-Qaeda’s 
outrages can tempt America into dangerous mis-steps. If America responds, and if 
its response has weighty consequences, then it needs a strategy.
There is much literature devoted to this problem. But most focuses on devel-
oping new descriptive language for the conflict, new futurologies or new organi-
zational reform. Important as these are, they are not strategy.
26 The White House, US National Security Strategy (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, March 
2006), p. 9; and The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington DC: US Government 
Printing Office, Sept. 2006), p. 7. See also Antulio Echevarria, Wars of ideas and the war of ideas (Carlisle, PA: US 
Army War College, June 2008).
27 On this point, see also Jeffrey Record, Bounding the global war on terrorism (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 
Dec. 2003), p. 6.
28 Ian Lustick, Trapped in the war on terror (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) and John 
Mueller, Overblown: how politicians and the terrorism industry inflate national security threats, and why we believe them 
(New York: Free Press, 2006).
29 Robin M. Frost, Nuclear terrorism after 9/11, Adelphi Paper 378 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2005).
30 ‘World Bank says poor nations will suffer worst economic toll’, New York Times, 2 Oct. 2001. Bali’s tourist 
trade was devastated by bomb attacks in 2002 and 2005. See Rita A. Widiadana, ‘Terrorist bombings have 
 crippled tourism in Bali’, CDNN, 29 Dec. 2005, http://www.cdnn.info/news/travel/t051229.html, accessed 1 
June 2008.
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Both the US government and its critics call for a new vocabulary to define today’s 
monsters.31 Rarely are wars so often rebranded. Labels, from the ‘war on terror’ 
to the ‘long war’ to the ‘global counterinsurgency’, are used and then rejected for 
being too ambitious, too incendiary or too open-ended. Political leaders reformu-
late the war to stress its complexity and time horizon; but the same leaders also, 
contradictorily, declare victory, turning-points, clean-up phases, ‘last throes’ and 
‘Mission Accomplished’. Language with a short lifespan suggests a void of strategic 
thought. And new labels are no shortcut for coherent strategy. This poverty of 
thought is compounded by politics and the short-term tempo of the voting cycle. 
As George Bush instructed, ‘I don’t want to see anyone commenting in the press 
about an insurgency. We have an election to win.’32
Military discourse offers much futurology but little strategy. Some foresee a 
future of newly powerful insurgent-terrorists or wars between modern states and 
primordial Others.33 Some visions are shallow, such as the view that wars ‘will 
be fought over ideas and values not territory’, as if Afghan fighters did not covet 
soil.34 To stress the non-linear complexity of future war may be usefully descrip-
tive. But this tells us about the skills we need to conduct the war, not when or how 
to use them.
And then there is organizational reform. Within government, there is much 
jargon about organizational flexibility, ‘capabilities organised cross-enterprise, 
adapting dynamically to uncertainty and turbulence in a multi-dimensional, 
nonlinear, competitive environment’.35 This too is no substitute for strategy. 
Without a common conceptual ground on which to plan policy, the state cannot 
fix its polycratic interagency mess with organizational tinkering alone.36
Some argue that the United States needs to revive its public diplomacy (as 
embodied by, for example, the US Information Agency) to win the war of ideas.37 
Valuable as this activity is, messages and images are not free-floating com modities. 
They rely on actions for their currency. Statements of good intentions have 
limited value if they clash with behaviour. Military occupations provide the 
enemy with propaganda opportunities that even sophisticated public diplomacy 
31 Ten days after 9/11, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called for a ‘new vocabulary’ to define the new war 
against terrorism. Donald Rumsfeld, ‘Pentagon briefing on aircraft deployment’, Washington Post, 20 Sept. 
2001; James Fallows, ‘Declaring victory’, Atlantic Monthly, no. 298, Sept. 2006, pp. 60–73; George Packer, 
‘Namecalling’, New Yorker, 8 Aug. 2005.
32 Cited in Linda Robinson, Tell me how this ends: General David Petraeus and the search for a way out of Iraq (New York: 
Publc Affairs, 2008), p. 5.
33 Thomas X. Hammes, ‘Fourth generation warfare evolves, fifth emerges’, Military Review 87: 3, May–June 
2007, pp. 14–23 and Montgomery McFate, ‘The military utility of understanding adversary culture’, Joint Force 
Quarterly 38, July 2005, pp. 42–8.
34 Lamont Kirkland, ‘Future challenges for land forces’, British Army Review, 142, Summer 2007, pp. 10–13 
at  p.  10.
35 Cited in Brian McAllister Linn, The echo of battle: the army’s way of war (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2007), p. 3.
36 Tony Corn identifies this problem of government dysfunctionality without a shared strategic vision as ‘Opera-
tion Infinite Conversation’. ‘World War IV as fourth-generation warfare’, Policy Review, Jan. 2006. Online at 
http://www.hoover.org.publications/policyreview/486838.htm.
37 Owen Barron, ‘A new approach: engaging the Muslim world through public diplomacy’, Harvard International 
Review 28: 4, Winter 2007, pp. 30–34.
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would struggle to negate, such as the continued deaths of Afghan civilians from 
coalition air strikes.
To adapt, the American military is reforming itself. During its extraordinary 
efforts in Iraq, it ransacked the ‘small wars’ of European colonial empires for the 
new US COIN field manual.38 Yet this renaissance in counterinsurgency technique 
represents an organizational and operational panacea for a ‘dangerous strategic 
vacuum’.39 Without an effective strategy, efforts to refine the military instrument 
prepare America to fight the wrong wars well rather than pick the right ones. 
There is mischief in the notion that old strategy is dead and that we face unique 
threats. It encourages the pursuit of ‘absolute security’, with even remote risks 
deemed unacceptable and required to be eliminated at all costs. Vice-President 
Dick Cheney’s ‘1 per cent doctrine’ insists that the most improbable risks must 
be swiftly destroyed rather than merely managed, without undue worry over 
standards of proof, because the risks of inaction outweigh the risks of action. Iraq 
was the laboratory for that doctrine. The results are not encouraging. The idea 
that today’s threats are stupendously deadly has also led to contempt for constitu-
tional liberties. Some American officials claim that new terrors make the Geneva 
Convention or the Constitution obsolete.40
Reductionist views of history also underpin a growing conventional wisdom 
in US defence policy. Reformists urge militaries to de-emphasize the task of 
deterring and responding to state aggressors. They argue that armed forces must 
overhaul their doctrine, planning, force structure and acquisition programmes to 
become an imperial constabulary, continuously engaged in ‘lesser wars’, nation-
building and policing.41 This presents great risks. It could create a capability trap 
that deludes policy-makers. It conceives of the military not primarily as an insur-
ance policy but as a surgical tool to be routinely used in a militarized foreign 
policy. It also wrongly implies a view of the security landscape as an objective 
reality ‘out there’ with given tendencies that must be uncritically accepted. Left 
untempered by strategy, this could loosen healthy restraint, dilute critical capabili-
ties and turn a future of attritional wars into a self-fulfilling prophecy.42
Cold War visions
Some observers, unimpressed with rhapsodies about the new world, argue that 
the war on terror is best served cold.43 How can Kennanism be applied today? 
38 US Army Marine Corps, FM 3–24: counterinsurgency field manual (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2006), 
foreword by David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos.
39 So Alex Marshall argues in ‘Imperial nostalgia, the liberal lie, and the perils of postmodern counterinsurgency’ 
(forthcoming), p. 18.
40 R. Jeffrey Smith and Dan Eggen, ‘Gonzales helped set the course for detainees: justice nominee’s hearings 
likely to focus on interrogation policies’, Washington Post, 5 Jan. 2005, p. A01 and David Nason, ‘Secret trials 
for terrorists, says US judge’, The Australian, 29 June 2007.
41 This internal debate is anatomized further by Andrew J. Bacevich, ‘The Petraeus Doctrine’, Atlantic Monthly 
302: 3, Oct. 2008.
42 As Michael J. Mazarr suggests, in ‘The folly of “asymmetric war”’, Washington Quarterly 31: 3, 2008, pp. 33–53 
at p. 35.
43 Andreas Herberg-Rothe, ‘New containment policy: a grand strategy for the twenty-first century?’, 
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Even if containment can be transposed from the Cold War to the war on terror, 
there are substantial contextual differences. Kennan’s containment was a highly 
 geostrategic concept. He prioritized the defence of the industrial–military centres 
of western Europe and Japan, and the lines of communication that linked them 
with the United States.44 By contrast, a containment strategy against Al-Qaeda 
must aim primarily at limiting its capabilities and following, minimizing its 
capacity to attack the way of life and vital foreign interests of the United States 
and its allies, from sea lanes to population centres to key resources. A territorial 
element will always be present with Al-Qaeda. But this is an enemy that must be 
contained as a dispersed force—part ideology, part armed movement.
Containment in the Cold War addressed an overriding objective of US policy. 
The Soviet Union was a heavily populated state with an east European empire. 
To make it a secondary consideration was not realistic. By contrast, containment 
strategy now should aim to relativize Al-Qaeda among other dangers, including 
the enduring reality of great power competition, preventing it from becoming the 
consuming preoccupation of American foreign policy.45
There are many versions of Kennanism. Jay Carafano’s Winning the long war is 
a sunny interpretation that embraces the Eisenhower–Dulles version of contain-
ment, the ‘New Look’ that sought a balance between military commitments and 
economic resources.46 If Americans hold dear their liberal values, sustain their 
economy, tighten homeland security and maintain pressure, ultimate victory is 
assured. But this manifesto leaves one question unaddressed. Why should we be 
confident that this approach will work? Other than a full-throated confidence in 
American free-market democracy, there is little analysis of the causal links that will 
lead to eventual victory.
By contrast, Ian Shapiro and Nicholas Thompson present Kennan as the antith-
esis to President Bush and his disastrous military adventures.47 Both are incisive, but 
both offer liberal internationalism instead of Kennanist realism. To them, contain-
ment today means affirming diplomacy. Shapiro stresses international law, arguing 
for restoration of the United Nations as the sole legitimate authority for military 
force. As Shapiro recognizes, Kennan had little faith in the UN’s writ, calling this 
approach a ‘sterile and cumbersome international parliamentarianism’.48 While this 
is not entirely fair, the people of Rwanda, Darfur, Zimbabwe and Burma could 
be forgiven for agreeing with him. Kennan focused on the exercise of geopolitical 
power rather than the authority of institutions.
 RUSI   Journal 153: 2, April 2008, pp. 50–54; Ian Shapiro, Containment: rebuilding a strategy against global terror 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Nicholas Thompson, ‘A war best served cold’, New York Times, 
31 July 2007 and Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig, Winning the long war: lessons from the Cold War for defeating 
terrorism and preserving freedom (Washington DC: Heritage Books, 2005).
44 John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Containment and the logic of strategy’ The National Interest 10, 1987–8, pp. 27–38 at p. 32.
45 However, as Barry Buzan indicates, this difference has not informed grand strategy: ‘The Cold War pretty 
much was US grand strategy in a deep sense; the GWoT is not, but, as a brief glance at the USNSS of 2006 
will show, is being promoted as if it were.’ Barry Buzan, ‘Will the “global war on terrorism” be the new Cold 
War?’, International Affairs 82: 6, November 2006, pp. 1101–18 at p. 1102.
46 Carafano and Rosenzweig, Winning the long war.
47 Shapiro, Containment and Thompson, ‘A war best served cold’.
48 Cited in Gaddis, Strategies of containment, p. 28.
INTA85_2_05_Porter.indd   10 11/2/09   08:35:36
Long wars and long telegrams
11
International Affairs 85: 2, 2009
© 2009 The Author(s). Journal Compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs
With regard to force, Kennan’s ideas were complex.49 He became aghast at the 
overmilitarization of containment, signalled in the unmeasured rhetoric of the 
Truman Doctrine and the extravagance of NSC-68. He also distanced himself from 
the doctrine in his Vietnam-era memoirs. At the time he formulated the concept, 
though, he believed military power had a limited but definite role. Foreign policy 
and military power were part of a subtly graded continuum. Military power was 
a tool of deterrence, a way to signal US interests and induce allies’ confidence, a 
power to be wielded sparingly in small theatres and in the last resort as a means 
of countering a Soviet invasion. Skilful diplomacy was enabled by ‘a little quiet 
force’. To deter the Yugoslav ruler Tito during the Trieste crisis, Kennan urged 
the quick reinforcement of Anglo-American forces in the Adriatic. He also gave 
qualified support for US military assistance to Greece in 1947 and Korea in 1950. 
So Thompson exaggerates when he describes Kennan’s containment as ‘wholly 
political’.
To make containment relevant, Shapiro draws a parallel between Al-Qaeda 
and the Soviet Union in one respect, as a force that can be rationally conciliated. 
He suggests that bin Laden wages only a ‘defensive jihad’ against American and 
Israeli domination of the Middle East.50 This therapeutic vision reduces Al-Qaeda 
to a contemporary form of anti-colonial resistance whose behaviour is largely a 
by-product of western encroachment. This is a long way from Kennan, who argued 
that the enemy of his time, the Soviet elite, was driven less by legitimate security 
considerations and more by inherent hostility, which came from the built-in Soviet 
practice of creating internal legitimacy through the fiction of external threat.51
Al-Qaeda’s actions and statements suggest there is much more to its jihad than 
waging a reactive war to defend the umma, or Muslim world, from western inter-
lopers. It is more than defensive to proclaim that ‘Muslims are obligated to raid the 
lands of the infidels, occupy them, and exchange their systems of governance for 
an Islamic system.’ It is more than anti-colonial to insist, as bin Laden did in a letter 
to the Saudis, that people ‘either submit, or live under the suzerainty of Islam, or 
die’.52 When Al-Qaeda banned women from buying cucumbers in Anbar because 
they are suggestively shaped, or amputated the fingers of smokers, they probably 
had more in mind than Palestinian suffering in Gaza.53 Al-Qaeda’s communiqués 
list specific policy grievances against America. But its other literature calls for 
indiscriminate war against infidels. It declares and conducts wars against Muslims 
of many kinds and expresses hostility towards Hindus, Jews and homosexuals. 
Its declared enemies are multiplying, including the United Nations, France and 
49 See David Mayers, George Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
pp. 122–3; George Kennan, ‘Measures short of war’, in Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz, eds, Measures 
short of war: the George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946–47 (Washington DC: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 3–21, 13–16.
50 Shapiro, Containment, pp. 43–44, 80.
51 See John O. Iatrides, ‘George Kennan and the birth of containment: the Greek test case’, World Policy Journal 
22: 3, 2005, pp. 126–45, 130–31.
52 Both are cited in Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda reader (New York: Broadway, 2007), pp. 51, 19–20.
53 ‘Al-Qa’eda in Iraq alienated by cucumber laws and brutality’, Daily Telegraph, 11 Aug. 2008 and ‘Al Qaeda’s 
brutality alienates Iraqis’, Reuters, 11 Aug. 2008.
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India.54 Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have carried their offensive to many fronts, 
among them Nigeria, Bangladesh, East Timor and China. Beyond defensive jihad, 
it is the will to power of a movement rooted in existential fury.
But if Kennan’s admirers are sometimes mistaken historically, they are right on 
the main question: that the enemy can be contained. Recent developments show 
why. 
A self-defeating enemy
Al-Qaeda (‘the base’) is a militant Islamist movement that seeks to enforce a 
dogmatic version of the Qur’an and Islamic law, purify Islam and restore a lost 
empire, the caliphate. It represents a shift in strategy towards long-range jihad, 
to take local wars to the ‘far enemy’, the United States. It is a dynamic phenom-
enon, and its exact shape and morphology are still hotly debated.55 If it is a cadre 
of well-organized and hardened activists, it is also a system of franchises with 
worldwide affiliates and self-mobilizing ‘bunches of guys’, some of whom obtain 
expertise, training and finance from the network. Operationally, it is an adaptive 
movement that has shown the capacity to regenerate itself. It continues to find 
new safe havens and to recast its ideological messages. It adds fresh grievances to 
its list, from American bases in Saudi Arabia to the Kyoto Treaty to headscarves in 
French schools.
In the long run, Al-Qaeda tends towards self-destruction. Majority world 
opinion is that the war on terror has not weakened Al-Qaeda.56 But there is 
impressive evidence that Al-Qaeda is discrediting itself. Surveys such as the Pew 
Poll and the Simon Fraser study of terrorism suggest a sharp worldwide decline in 
Muslim support for Al-Qaeda and its methods.57 In Pakistan, according to the poll 
conducted by Terror Free Tomorrow, public opinion has shifted against Osama 
bin Laden, falling from 33 per cent in August 2007 to 18 per cent in January 2008. 
In Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, support for bin Laden fell from 70 per 
cent in August 2007 to 4 per cent in January 2008.58 In Saudi Arabia, his homeland, 
only 10 per cent now express support for him. Within the United States, the 
overwhelming majority of Muslims reject terrorism and extremism.59 Al-Qaeda’s 
54 In September 2006, al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s number two, announced an alliance with the Salafist Group for 
Teaching and Combat in Algeria against ‘French crusaders’. ‘Al Qaeda issues France threat’, BBC News, 14 
Sept. 2006. Zawahiri has declared the UN the ‘enemy of Islam’. ‘UN enemy of Islam: Al Qa’ida deputy’, The 
Australian, 3 April 2008. On 8 June 2007, Abu Abdul Rahman Ansari, who claimed to be the spokesperson of 
‘Al Qaeda Hind’, declared war on India: Stratfor, 8 June 2007.
55 Elaine Sciolino and Eric Schmitt, ‘A not very private feud over terrorism’, New York Times, 8 June 2008; Bruce 
Hoffman, ‘The myth of grass-roots terrorism’, Foreign Affairs 87: 3, May/June 2008, pp. 133–9.
56 ‘“War on terror” has not weakened al Qaeda: poll’, Reuters, 29 Sept. 2008.
57 The 2007 Global Opinion Trends Survey, by the US Pew Research Center, found that support for suicide bomb-
ing had fallen across the world since 2002, although it had risen among Palestinians. BBC News, 25 July 2007 
and Simon Fraser Human Security Report Project, http://www.sfu.ca/sfunews/Stories/sfunews061208015.
shtml, accessed 15 October 2008.
58 Terror Free Tomorrow, the Center for Public Opinion, ‘Results of a new nationwide public opinion survey of 
Pakistan before the February 18th elections’ (Washington DC, 2008) and figures on the North-West Frontier 
cited also in Fareed Zakaria, ‘The only thing we have to fear … If you set aside the war in Iraq, terrorism has 
in fact gone way down over the past five years’, Newsweek, 24 May 2008.
59 Alexandra Marks, ‘Radical Islam finds US sterile ground’, Christian Science Monitor, 23 Oct. 2006.
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stock has also plummeted in countries as dispersed as Afghanistan, Bangladesh 
and Indonesia. These signs support CIA director Michael Hayden’s claims that 
Al-Qaeda has been wrong-footed by a ‘blowback’.60 None of these patterns of 
opinion are irreversible. But together they demonstrate that where Al-Qaeda takes 
its methods, people become hostile to it.
Most strikingly, Al-Qaeda has alienated what it once saw as its most natural 
constituency, the Sunni heartland of Iraq. Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, anointed by 
bin Laden as the ‘Prince of Al-Qaeda in Iraq’, represented Al-Qaedaism at its most 
barbaric extreme in his career of beheadings, murder and intimidation. His atroci-
ties, such as the bombing of a Palestinian wedding in Jordan in November 2005, 
drew angry international protests. His death was celebrated in Baghdad. In Iraq, 
former allies—even those Sunni supremacists and crime lords who once spear-
headed resistance to the American occupation—have now turned on Al-Qaeda 
with ferocity. This is not to mythologize the ‘surge’ or prematurely declare 
victory. The realignment of forces in Iraq may be temporary and has many causes. 
The restraint of the cleric and power figure Muqtada al-Sadr, the results of prior 
communal violence and an opportunist ‘pause’ in the conflict may be factors.61 And 
the surge might itself be corrosive of America’s long-term objectives of fostering 
a strong central state by strengthening local forces, it could ultimately undermine 
this effort. The evidence remains, though, that Al-Qaeda created new enemies 
because it failed to bridle its members’ behaviour.
Revealingly, this happens in places the United States has not invaded militarily, 
such as Algeria, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. In Algeria, the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat began a wave of suicide bombings after it formally affili-
ated itself with Al-Qaeda in September 2006. An audiotape of Al-Qaeda’s own 
recent ‘open meeting’ in April 2008 indicated an audience increasingly hostile to 
its methods of killing innocent Muslims, such as the assault of December 2007 
in the Islamic Maghreb.62 As one supporter asked, ‘Who is it who is killing with 
Your Excellency’s blessing, the innocents in Baghdad, Morocco and Algeria?’ In 
Libya, former leader of the Islamic Fighting Group Noman Benotman persuaded 
his successors to enter peace talks with the Libyan government in January 2007 and 
called on Al-Qaeda to abort its operations both in the West and in Arab countries.63 
Benotman’s alienation from Al-Qaeda did not happen because of its activities in 
Iraq or Afghanistan. It began earlier, in 1998, where he resigned after warning bin 
Laden that attacking the United States would result in disaster and that the jihad in 
Algeria had destroyed local support. His falling out with Al-Qaeda was indepen-
dent of America’s later war. In Saudi Arabia, Al-Qaeda’s prestige and credibility 
has collapsed, partly as a result of Al-Qaeda’s attacks there.64 Other contributory 
factors are state measures, from rehabilitation techniques seeking to cure young 
60 Joby Warrick, ‘U.S. cites big gains against Al Qaeda’, Washington Post, 30 May 2008, p. A01.
61 Steven Simon, ‘How U.S. strategy is hastening Iraq’s demise’, Foreign Affairs 87: 3, May–June 2008, 
pp.  57–76.
62 Stephen Tankel, ‘Spinning Al Qaida’, Guardian, 22 April 2008.
63 Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, ‘The unravelling: the jihadist revolt against bin Laden’, New Republic, 11 
June 2008.
64 Bobby Ghosh, ‘Jihad waning in Osama’s homeland’, Time, 12 Sept. 2008.
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men of ‘deviant’ beliefs to new regulations on formerly unmonitored religious 
charities and King Abdullah’s public campaign against Al-Qaeda propaganda.
Bin Laden’s movement also undergoes internal splinterings. Some prominent 
jihadists and authorities have now broken with the cause. In May 2008 India’s author-
itative Deoband movement, which once endorsed and gave religious instruction 
to militants from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, issued a fatwa against terrorism. 
Earlier, in October 2007, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia issued a fatwa forbidding 
Saudi youth from waging jihad outside the nation while another Saudi cleric once 
praised by bin Laden, Sheikh Salman Al Oudah, publicly denounced Al-Qaeda’s 
violence. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, also known as Dr Fadl, was formerly the leader 
of the Egyptian group Al-Jihad and one of the founding fathers of Al-Qaeda. This 
veteran now renounces Al-Qaeda’s ways as both doctrinally wrong and politically 
futile, favouring instead more limited jihad. He has also challenged Al-Qaeda’s 
religious authority.65 His disavowal follows previous schisms within Egypt that 
emerged particularly among imprisoned activists, such as the revisionism and 
non-violence initiative that split the Islamic Group in 1997. The Gama’a al-Islami-
yyah, the ally of al-Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad, has lost many of its leaders, who have 
published around 20 ‘recantations’ that interpret the Qur’an as a text of peaceful 
activism. As Juan Cole observes, an ironic outcome of 9/11 has been ‘to turn one 
of the major Egyptian fundamentalist organisations into a peace movement’.66 In 
London, meanwhile, the ex-militant Usama Hassan, who had trained in Afghani-
stan, was alienated by Al-Qaeda civilian attacks and the July 2005 bombings and 
now preaches against radicalism.
All this is ominous for a terrorist movement. History suggests that the public 
renunciation of terrorism by influential former members and the failure of the 
cause to make the transition over generations, can damage the movement’s legiti-
macy and following.67 Not only does Al-Qaeda generate antibodies outside 
itself, it creates a revolt from within. It generates its own counter-radicalization 
programme.
How can we explain this broad pattern? It grows from vulnerabilities both 
ideological and structural. Ideologically, Al-Qaeda suffers from a fatal contra-
diction. It claims to be the knight of Islam; yet it persecutes and impoverishes 
Muslims. Its actions undermine its claim to represent Islam, its interests, griev-
ances and ambitions. Contrary to some analysis, it is not only a rebellion against 
western norms or American influence. It is part of a civil war within Islam to 
purify the faith against secular modernity, heresy and corruption. It espouses a 
doctrine of takfir, whereby it claims to pronounce on who and what constitutes 
genuine Islam. This literalist, narrow ideology warrants aggression against anyone 
who fails to meet its rigid standards. While it seeks to inspire ordinary Muslims 
65 Lawrence Wright, ‘The rebellion within: an Al Qaeda mastermind questions terrorism’, New Yorker, 2 June 
2008.
66 Juan Cole, ‘On the seventh anniversary of September 11: time to declare the original al-Qaeda defeated’, 
http://www.juancole.com/2008/09/on-seventh-anniversary-of-September-11.html, accessed 11 September 
2008
67 Audrey Cronin, ‘How al-Qaeda ends: the decline and demise of terrorist groups’, International Security 31: 1, 
2006, pp. 7–48 at pp. 20, 22.
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to join its struggle, it regards as enemies any Muslims deemed impure or unsup-
portive and declares whole groups of Muslims to be unbelievers.68 Its ideology of 
excommunication undermines its capacity to include. Unlike more hybrid, part-
militant, part-governing movements such as Hezbollah or the Taleban, which base 
their legitimacy partly on their role as welfare providers or on local nationalism, 
Al-Qaeda offers little philosophy of government beyond violence and repression.
In terms of structure Al-Qaeda is a loose network rather than a unitary nation-
state. This makes Al-Qaeda more vulnerable. Its fluidity may make it harder to 
cripple or destroy; but this is a weakness as well as a strength. As a ‘big tent’ that 
attracts localized struggles, Al-Qaeda exerts only limited control over its adherents. 
It draws to itself forces that it may not be able to discipline. Abu Turab al-Jazairi, an 
Al-Qaeda commander in Iraq, complained to the Qatari newspaper Al-Arab that 
only a third of his fellow jihadists in Mesopotamia were reliable and that ‘Al-Qaeda 
has been infiltrated by people who have harmed its reputation’.69 It suffers the 
drawbacks of a ‘franchise’ operation. Hence the dilemma faced by al-Zawahiri in 
his open meeting. Confronted by a local affiliate in Algeria murdering Muslims 
over which he has little control, he defended its activities after the fact before 
an audience of dismayed fellow believers. The Economist warns that Al-Qaeda can 
change this easily: ‘It just needs to kill more Westerners and fewer Muslims.’70 
It lacks, however, the top-down command structure and organizational unity to 
make this change.
Some caveats are important here. Al-Qaeda has rational, subtle minds in its 
ranks who think about the goals and effects of violence. As its chief theorist 
Ayman al-Zawahiri pronounced, its violence is instrumental and has a purpose.71 
Thinkers such as Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu Bakr Naji know that brutal methods 
can alienate wider Muslim opinion. The title of Naji’s book, The management of 
savagery, is instructive. And jihad is not reducible to irrational fanaticism. There 
is such a thing as a calculating terrorist or terrorist sponsor—think of Libya or 
Hezbollah—approaching violence as a measured tool of coercion. And suicide 
bombing, a collective and organizational phenomenon, should not be reduced to a 
manifestation of an individual’s psychological deformity. There is also much more 
to this than religion. Jihadi extremism also revolves around crime. The Taleban 
incorporates gangsters who reinvent themselves as holy warriors while the revolt 
by Sunni power-brokers against Al-Qaeda was partly triggered by competition 
over bandit fiefdoms and smuggling routes.72 Nevertheless, allowing for these 
68 Mary Habeck also identifies this contradiction. Knowing the enemy: jihadist ideology and the war on terror (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 166–7.
69 Al-Arab (Qatar), 12 Feb. 2008, cited in MEMRI (Middle East Media Research Institute) Special Dispatch Series 
1866: ‘Al-Qaeda commander in northern Iraq: we are in dire straits’.
70 ‘A radical new strategy: kill fewer Muslims’, The Economist, 5 June 2008.
71 ‘If the successful operations against Islam’s enemies and the severe damage inflicted on them do not serve the 
ultimate goal of establishing the Muslim nation in the heart of the Islamic world, they will be nothing more 
than disturbing acts, regardless of their magnitude, that could be absorbed and endured.’ Cited in Thomas G. 
Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo, Strategic studies: a reader (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 2.
72 ‘To win favor with the Taliban, the criminals grow their hair and their beards, and join forces with the mili-
tants, they said. In this way, the criminals get protection from the militants for the money they give to the 
Taliban from their extortion rackets.’ Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, ‘Taliban imperial Pakistani city, a major 
INTA85_2_05_Porter.indd   15 11/2/09   08:35:37
Patrick Porter
16
International Affairs 85: 2, 2009
© 2009 The Author(s). Journal Compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs
qualifiers, Al-Qaeda cannot but attract the kinds of actors who practise violence 
indiscriminately.
Then we come to the domestic context. In western Europe and the United 
States, there are small and often fleetingly existent ‘cells’. These are eminently 
containable. Too much can be made of the legions of potential terrorists estimated 
by Britain’s domestic intelligence services.73 However strongly motivated they may 
be, Al-Qaeda’s budding fifth columnists are often downright amateurish. Clearly 
there are still exceptions, where luck, skill and neglected vulnerabilities can result 
in a spectacular attack. But incompetence is the norm. As Rod Liddle points out,
many years hence the terrible destruction of the twin towers will still be lodged in our 
minds, the image of the buildings crumpling, the video of Osama Bin Laden sniggering in 
his cave. But a similarly iconic image would be of the moron Richard Reid trying desper-
ately to set his training shoe on fire on a plane, having forgotten to bring a lighter.74
Two factors help to explain this disjunction between perceived and actual threat. 
First, the state takes the danger seriously: 9/11 and subsequent attacks got the author-
ities’ attention. Despite the accompanying incompetence and heavy-handedness, 
the focus and energy of the state have helped to make the environment harder 
to operate in. Second, terrorism is harder than it looks. Mohammed Atta, the 9/11 
ringleader, was a highly talented engineering student with meticulous ways. He 
is atypical. Most would-be Islamist radicals in the First World seem flustered and 
indiscreet. As well as focusing on the sociology of radicalization, states should 
continue limiting the ability of radicals to obtain operational training.
Policy implications
Al-Qaeda’s tendency towards implosion—its alienation of opinion, its internal 
schisms—does not need to be directed by the United States. Its talent at self-
destruction can and does operate independently of American military might. Some 
of the atrocities that offended Islamic sentiment happened outside America’s area 
of major military operations. Even in Iraq, as David Kilcullen stresses, America 
did not initiate the Anbar Awakening. It abetted what had already erupted as an 
authentic revolt ‘from below’. ‘We should remember that this uprising against 
extremism belongs to the Iraqi people, not to us—it was their idea, they started 
it, they are leading it, it is happening on their terms and on their timeline.’75 If the 
enemy is ultimately the agent of its own gradual failure and collapse, the United 
States can limit its efforts as Al-Qaeda, its offshoots and imitators fall out among 
themselves and indiscriminately offend others.
hub’, New York Times, 28 June 2008. On criminal markets and the Anbar awakening, see Austin Long, ‘The 
Anbar awakening’, Survival 50: 2, April–May 2008, pp. 67–94 at p. 77. See also Carter Malkasian, ‘A thin blue 
line in the sand’, Democracy 5, Summer 2007, p. 55.
73 In November 2007 the Director-General of MI5 identified over 2,000 al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist suspects on 
UK soil. ‘Thousands pose UK terror threat’, BBC News, 5 Nov. 2007.
74 Rod Liddle, ‘Either Allah isn’t on their side, or jihadis are just plain useless’, The Times, 25 May 2008.
75 David Kilcullen, ‘Anatomy of a tribal revolt’, Small Wars Journal, 29 Aug. 2007, at http://smallwarsjournal.
com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/, accessed 30 August 2008.
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Though a containment strategy counsels patience, containment is not the same 
as passivity or neutrality. In terms of active measures, there is a menu of more 
modest steps that it can take. In a sense, a multinational containment strategy 
already exists. It disrupts and interdicts terrorist networks by attacking the flow 
of finances, restricting the movements of militants and tracking down principal 
leaders.76
Stealth power is another tool. A limited, targeted and dextrous use of force 
against Al-Qaeda is part of the solution. Contrary to critiques that dismiss any 
kind of coercion, there is a utility to killing and capturing Al-Qaeda agents. Israel’s 
controversial history of targeted assassinations shows the damage that can be done 
by such means to the capability of an irregular enemy like Hamas.77 Applied 
to Al-Qaeda, such a policy limits the organization’s capability, minimizing the 
mayhem it can inflict within its lifespan. It also has more immediate effects. First, 
it drains talent. Skilled terrorism is a learned and hard-won practice. The pool of 
talented bomb-makers, organizers, fundraisers and document-forgers is limited. 
Of 10,000 would-be bin Ladens, most lack ability. Continual erosion of experi-
enced practitioners makes it harder for terrorists to operate. It also forces them 
to spend time trying to stay alive, fleeing from location to location. The death or 
disappearance of members can also foster internal paranoia and division. Suspicion 
of internal treachery can minimize communication and slow down recruitment. 
The loss of critical personnel can stimulate internal power struggles to replace 
them. Cumulatively, this might not prevent all attacks, but it can reduce their 
number and make them less effective.
This is not a political solution. And a kill/capture policy can energize an enemy. 
But if the United States can eliminate Al-Qaeda personnel within a context where 
broader political currents undermine its appeal, it can bound terrorism within 
acceptable limits, keeping the movement off-balance, paranoid and distracted. And 
the continual molestation of a group like Al-Qaeda can have desirable political 
effects by undermining its credibility, which rests partly on its ability to inflict 
blows on America. Here is an instance where physical success (the disruption of 
terrorist capability) can assist the ‘war of ideas’. It is not without problems. A 
targeted assassination policy invariably kills innocents. This would be a lesser 
evil, though, and more acceptable to public opinion, than the deaths of thousands 
resulting from military occupation.
To shape an environment that is inhospitable to Al-Qaeda and its ideology, 
there are other measures vastly less expensive and risky than major military opera-
tions. New US military doctrine recognizes the power of altruism.78 By using its 
humanitarian muscle, America can underline the moral distance between itself 
and Al-Qaeda. The Berlin blockade of 1948–9 offers a suggestive parallel. This 
76 As Antulio Echevarria argues, in Fourth generation warfare and other myths (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 
2005), pp. 5–6.
77 Gal Luft, ‘The logic of Israel’s targeted killing’, Middle East Quarterly 10: 1, 2003 and Patrick Bishop, ‘Has Israel 
beaten the suicide bombers?’, Daily Telegraph, 22 May 2004.
78 Bryan Bender, ‘Pentagon flexes its altruism muscle: aims to win trust with soft power’, Boston Globe, 28 July 
2008.
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moment, as Kennan agreed, fixed the world’s attention on the contest between 
a Stalinist siege and the heroic relief work of Anglo-American air power. Swift 
humanitarian assistance undercuts the image of America the imperialist predator. 
In 2005, polls showed that earthquake relief work doubled the percentage of 
Pakistanis with positive views of the United States, from 23 per cent to 46 per 
cent.79 American relief efforts after the tsunami devastated the Asia–Pacific strongly 
improved opinion towards the United States in nations including Indonesia, the 
largest Muslim society.80 With its maritime power and reach, the US military is 
well placed to assist this kind of activity. And it can achieve this effect at a fraction 
of the cost of operations in Iraq. This is not to suggest that the military be trans-
formed into the armed wing of the Red Cross. But humanitarian work has strategic 
dimensions. It represents the kind of incremental, low-risk and affordable step in 
the propaganda war that nudges Al-Qaeda towards its demise.
A framework of Kennanist realism also values divisions that isolate the enemy. 
Kennan favoured using economic investment to sharpen divisions within inter-
national communism. Because Al-Qaeda has a propensity to implode and tends to 
make new enemies, the United States should remain alert for points of polarization. 
The separation of militant jihad from the masses can be encouraged, for example, 
by more constructive narcotics policy in Afghanistan. States could buy the crop 
from farmers rather than burning down the economy and creating a dispossessed 
class for hire. This would not win the war on drugs. But it would follow the logic of 
the Marshall Plan, of isolating the irreconcilable core from the wider populations 
who might provide material support. There are also promising fissures within the 
Taleban coalition, such as the divide between Mullah Omar and his rival  Siirajudin 
Haqqani. It is even possible that Al-Qaeda in its international jihad has fallen out 
with the Taleban and its local war. Unspecified elements from the Taleban are 
reportedly negotiating through Saudi mediation to break with Al-Qaeda.81 Even 
if this is unfounded, there are online feuds between Taleban leaders and influen-
tial Al-Qaeda sympathizers over Mullah Omar’s stated willingness to negotiate 
with the Karzai government and his expressed sympathy for Iran over sanctions.82 
The United States should remain open to opportunities to split the Islamist coali-
tion in Afghanistan and Pakistan, another step in the slow  strangulation of the 
movement. Such forces are not conveniently liberal. But criminal elements are 
already on the US payroll in Iraq. We need not react to unsavoury partners like 
a virgin confronted by a man in a dirty raincoat. And separating Al-Qaeda from 
other monsters is better than driving it into their arms.
In Afghanistan, the chances of bringing to birth a strong, liberal constitu-
tional government with a functioning modernized national military and police 
79 Lisa Curtis, ‘America’s image abroad: room for improvement’, Heritage Lecture, 31 May 2007, http://www.
heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl1027.cfmp.4, accessed 8 October 2008.
80 The Pew Global Attitudes survey reported that 79% of Indonesians say they have a more favourable view of 
the United States as a result of the relief efforts.
81 Nic Robertson, ‘Sources: Taliban split with al Qaeda, seek peace’, CNN Asia, 6 Oct. 2008.
82 Ron Synovitz, ‘Afghanistan: Al Qaeda bloggers’ sparring with Taliban could signal key differences’, Eurasia 
Insight, 12 March 2008, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp031208.shtml, accessed 13 
October 2008.
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force are insufficiently high for the resources that will have to be sacrificed in that 
cause. And we cannot afford the accompanying risk of escalating a ground war in 
 Afghanistan that is already expanding and intensifying across the border, fomenting 
ever greater volatility in Pakistani politics with unknown but surely dangerous 
consequences. The goal should be scaled back to a more modest but realistic one: 
to leave Afghanistan as a tolerably stable state that is hostile to Al-Qaeda. After 
all, this was the aim of the US-led war in the first place. In its efforts to combat 
Al-Qaeda and its network, Kabul can be internationally supported in other ways 
short of prolonged large-scale military presence. These would include providing 
Kabul with the cash to exert its presence and attempt to broker a coalition of 
any provincial commanders or powerful figures in insurgency areas strong enough 
to deny sanctuary to Al-Qaeda, as well as providing indirect advisory support, 
special forces training mission, moderation of internal dissent between warring 
factions and a scaled down military presence to curtail Al-Qaeda’s freedom to 
operate and to prevent it fully reconstituting. This approach will have a downside. 
It will probably entail the need to give qualified support to an indigenous regime 
bartering with warlords and other local elites, and to a persistence of corruption. 
Such a strategy would prefer stability over the anarchy of an escalating war or the 
utopianism of demanding impeccable standards of governing. But in the long run, 
that path would be less dangerous for both the region and for American interests 
than the current gamble.
A containment strategy places a ceiling on the threat while awaiting its eventual 
internal collapse. Against this, it allows more time to jihadists, possibly on a gener-
ational timescale, for further atrocities. But a hyperactive strategy of ‘rollback’ 
risks the more likely outcomes of financial haemorrhage, the erosion of consti-
tutional liberties and the inflaming of other world crises. Consider this in blunt 
policy terms. An Al-Qaeda at large, trying full-time to stay alive, pursued by an 
ever-growing set of enemies, even with the remote chance that it inflicts a terrible 
blow, is less dangerous than wars with Iran or Pakistan, an emptied treasury or a 
shredded constitution. Trading off time and conceding longevity to the enemy for 
the sake of lowering the war’s costs is worth it. This is because Al-Qaeda’s capacity 
to hurt America is less than America’s capacity to hurt itself.
Though Al-Qaeda tends towards self-destruction, this process may never 
be complete. The idea of militant jihad, implied within some forms of Islamist 
politics, will probably be reinvented and recast. A realistic strategy should set itself 
the target not of absolutely eradicating this threat, a goal which itself creates other 
crises, but reducing it to a manageable risk. Containment becomes a process not 
only of restraining the enemy but of restraining the action–reaction cycle of war.
But does containment ignore the underlying political swamp that created 
Al-Qaeda? One line of criticism asserts that only a solution to the Israeli–Pales-
tinian conflict can resolve the ‘root causes’ that nourish Al-Qaeda’s ideology. 
A new drive to end this tragedy is vital in its own right. A peaceful settlement 
will help arrest the radicalization of Palestinian and Israeli politics. But it is also 
one of the world’s most intractable conflicts. The United States has made several 
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imperfect efforts to broker a resolution, from the Oslo Accords of 1993 to the 
Camp David talks of 2000. The conflict is rooted in irreconcilable disagreements, 
the role of  rejectionist ‘spoilers’ in domestic Israeli and Palestinian politics and 
the  destabilizing efforts of external parties. It is too fragile and labyrinthine to 
be the central focus of a containment strategy. Moreover, the notion that this is 
necessary to defeat Al-Qaeda is factually flawed. Islamic audiences worldwide 
are not waiting for a settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict to turn away 
from Al-Qaeda. The evidence shows that they are capable of rejecting barbaric 
methods independently of this issue. Diplomatic miracles are not a precondition 
for Al-Qaeda’s defeat.
The war in Iraq was itself an attempt to address ‘root causes’. Before 9/11, 
according to President Bush, America’s bargain with Arab autocracies created a 
monster; the only way to defeat the menace was to end the accommodation with 
tyranny that hatched it by introducing a democratic alternative. Four consider-
ations throw doubt on this. First, we have learned the limits of American power. 
There is evidence that the democratic impulse, constitutional governments and 
open societies are not the minimal long-term antidote to the threat. The presump-
tion that Afghanistan must become a liberal democracy to be hostile to Al-Qaeda 
is unfounded. Evidence from Saudi Arabia suggests that more limited measures 
within authoritarian states can go a long way in curtailing it. But even if it were 
true that jihadi extremism, or this wave of it, could be killed off only by profound 
changes in the international system, Washington cannot afford to force this 
change at its timetable, especially as the attempt breeds collateral crises abroad and 
authoritarian misrule at home. Second, this policy kills hundreds of thousands of 
bystanders. Vietnam shows how such a policy can poison and polarize domestic 
politics and demoralize the nation. Third, 9/11 was not just a profound existential 
crisis in the Third World. It was also a failure of homeland security. Addressing 
those vulnerabilities is an achievable step that denies Al-Qaeda status. Finally, 
Al-Qaeda cannot address the complex problems of modern governance. Even 
societies that see the United States as the problem will reject Al-Qaeda’s claim to 
be the solution. Most Islamist politics is primarily local. Even if there is an Islamist 
revolution in Lebanon, Egypt or Saudi Arabia, it is unlikely that Al-Qaeda would 
be invited into any cabinet. Its war now tastes of ashes.
It is too early to know the exact approach of the new US administration. But 
there are firm indications that although Barack Obama and his advisers regard the 
Iraq war as a dangerous diversion from the war on terror, they also accept a central 
premise of the theology. This is the belief that the essence of the solution lies 
in the long-term military occupation of the right place—in Obama’s view, the 
true front is Central Asia—in support of political and economic reform. Here 
is continuity rather than change. But while targeted military force has a role in 
curtailing Al-Qaeda, it is military occupation that lacks utility. Historically, it is 
shown to be radicalizing, volatile and expensive. Only in exceptionally permissive 
and unusual geopolitical contexts, such as an exhausted and malnourished postwar 
Japan, can it succeed. By contrast, the omens in Afghanistan are less favourable. 
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An increased military occupation in support of a weak state will struggle to win 
 legitimacy in the eyes of the region, especially as it will almost certainly sustain 
the ‘war on drugs’, with its destabilizing results. And this issue will surface beyond 
Afghanistan. In future, there will be the temptation to occupy ‘failed states’ and 
law enforcement vacuums to combat terrorism. Unless the chances are excellent of 
military occupation succeeding with benign effect, it is more prudent to use more 
limited measures in pursuit of more achievable goals.
Conclusion
History is a treacherous guide to the present and future. But it is the only guide 
we have. To abandon history is to abandon proportion. Visions of the war on 
terror as an unprecedented, all-consuming struggle for absolute security have 
proven exhausting. While it has had successes, it has spawned other crises. George 
Kennan’s vision offers a better compass. As he warned, we should be wary not only 
of failure but of the price of victory lest we ‘allow ourselves to become like those 
with whom we are coping’.
America’s aim should be to sustain its open society while Al-Qaeda becomes 
an increasingly discredited and isolated nuisance. With measured attrition, 
America can limit Al-Qaeda’s capabilities and encourage its implosion. America 
cannot easily remove anti-Americanism. Any propaganda strategy to ‘sell’ a narra-
tive about America to the Middle East will struggle because it is mediated by 
an autocratic political order that deliberately transmutes public discontent into 
anti-Americanism. This will only be compounded if the United States remains a 
military occupier. But by restraining itself and making Al-Qaeda’s brutality the 
focus of opinion, the United States can assist the process whereby anti-Ameri-
canism is disentangled from Al-Qaeda-ism.
The greatest demand posed by containment is on leadership. A policy of restraint 
needs statesmen or -women who appeal to a public spirit of patient resilience. This 
is not easy, and the state’s reflex just to ‘do something’ in reaction to terrorism is 
tempting. But the idea of endurance is not unknown in American cosmology.83 If 
Al-Qaeda does get lucky and sinks a warship or lays waste a city, America needs 
leaders who urge their citizens not to despair of the Republic.
83 Stephen E. Flynn, ‘America the resilient: defying terrorism and mitigating natural disasters’, Foreign Affairs 
87:  2, March–April 2008, pp. 2–9.
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